LeClerc v. Webb: Rational Scrutiny Analysis of Equal Protection Claims by Nonimmigrant Aliens by Harrison, Kathleen Ann
Mississippi College Law Review 
Volume 25 
Issue 2 Vol. 25 Iss. 2 Article 9 
2006 
LeClerc v. Webb: Rational Scrutiny Analysis of Equal Protection 
Claims by Nonimmigrant Aliens 
Kathleen Ann Harrison 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Custom Citation 
25 Miss. C. L. Rev. 273 (2005-2006) 
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact walter@mc.edu. 
LECLERC V. WEBB: RATIONAL SCRUTINY ANALYSIS OF




Plaintiffs, nonimmigrant aliens seeking permission to sit for or be ad-
mitted to the Louisiana Bar, filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana in 2003.2 The suit was filed as two
separate actions.3 Both challenged the validity of Louisiana Supreme
Court Rule XVII, Section 3(B), which provides that "[e]very applicant for
admission to the Bar of this state shall... [b]e a citizen of the United States
or a resident alien thereof."4 In 2002, the Louisiana Supreme Court had
overturned its prior interpretation of the term "resident alien," redefining
it to refer exclusively to an alien holding permanent resident status.'
Under this definition of "resident alien," Section 3(B) would prohibit the
plaintiffs in these actions, legally admitted nonimmigrant aliens, from eligi-
bility for admission to the Louisiana Bar.6
In the first action, LeClerc v. Webb, the district court found that Sec-
tion 3(B) withstood the plaintiffs' equal protection challenges.7 Choosing
to apply rational basis review, it held Section 3(B) to be rationally related
to the state's legitimate interests.8 The LeClerc district court also held that
federal law does not preempt Section 3(B), dismissed one plaintiff's claim
under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and found
that plaintiffs did not state a claim for violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 In the second action, Wallace v. Calogero,
the judge disagreed with the LeClerc district court, finding that strict scru-
tiny, rather than rational basis scrutiny, should apply to plaintiffs' equal
1. J.D. candidate 2007, Tulane University School of Law; M.A. Latin American Studies 1999,
Tulane University; B.A. 1994, University of Virginia. The author sincerely wishes to thank Mike, Ni-
cole, and Kayleigh Harrison for their support and encouragement during the preparation of this Note.
2. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 410-13 (5th Cir. 2005), reh'g denied, 444 F.3d 428 (5th Cir.
2006). Named defendants were the Louisiana Supreme Court and the chairman and vice-chairman of
the Louisiana Committee on Bar Admissions. Id. at 411.
3. Id. at 410 n.1 (citing LeClerc v. Webb, 270 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. La. 2003); Wallace v. Ca-
logero, 286 F. Supp. 2d 748 (E.D. La. 2003)). The Eastern District denied plaintiffs' motion to consoli-
date the two cases. Id. at 413.
4. Id. at 410 (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted).
5. Id. (citing In re Bourke, 819 So. 2d 1020, 1022 (La. 2002)). The Louisiana Supreme Court's
prior interpretation of "resident alien" was "a 'foreign national[ ] lawfully within the United States."'
Id. (quoting In re Appert, 444 So. 2d 1208, 1208 (La. 1984) (alteration in original)).
6. See id. The plaintiffs held J-1 student visas or H-lB temporary worker visas at the time of the
Fifth Circuit's decision. Id. at 410-12.
7. See id. at 412.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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protection claims.'" Determining that the state had not chosen the least
restrictive means to achieve its compelling interests, the Wallace court held
Section 3(B) unconstitutional." The Wallace court also found the plain-
tiffs' due process claims moot and granted the defendants' motion to dis-
miss on a preemption claim. 12 The LeClerc and Wallace actions were
consolidated on appeal. 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that nonimmigrant aliens are not a suspect or quasi-suspect
class subject to strict or intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that Rule 3(B) survives rational
basis review. 4
II. BACKGROUND
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
a primary vehicle through which courts have attacked state legislation dis-
criminating against aliens.' 5 The Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state
from "deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."' 6 The Supreme Court applies rational basis review to most clas-
sifications made in state statutes, evaluating whether a classification is ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state interest. 17 Because of the dangers of
prejudice and the unlikely relevance to legitimate state purposes, however,
the Supreme Court has determined that classifications on the basis of race,
alienage, or national origin are suspect and subject to strict scrutiny rather
than rational basis scrutiny.'8 Under strict scrutiny, a state must demon-
strate that its interest is "both constitutionally permissible and substantial,
and that its use of the classification is 'necessary... to the accomplishment'
of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest."' 9 Moreover, the Court
has used an intermediate level of scrutiny to examine quasi-suspect classifi-
cations based on gender and illegitimacy. 0
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, an early equal protection case involving aliens,
the Supreme Court examined a San Francisco ordinance requiring opera-
tors of laundries housed in wooden buildings to obtain the consent of a
board of supervisors before operating.2 1 This ordinance, as applied, re-
sulted in the denial of permission to Chinese laundry operators, while all
but one of the white laundry operators received permission to operate. EE
10. Id. at 413.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 410 n.1.
14. ld. at 422.
15. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410
(1948); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
16. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
18. See id. at 440.
19. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 721-22.
20. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41.
21. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 357-58 (1886).
22. Id. at 359.
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The Court held the ordinance to be in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since it had no legitimate purpose
but instead was based on a hostile attitude to the petitioner's race and na-
tionality, and thus arbitrarily discriminated between persons similarly situ-
ated. 3 In sum, Yick Wo established that the safeguards of the Equal
Protection Clause apply to aliens as well as citizens.24
In Truax v. Raich, the Court examined the constitutionality of an Ari-
zona statute that required employers with more than five employees to em-
ploy at least eighty percent "qualified electors" or native-born citizens.25
The statute facially discriminated against aliens, potentially affecting both
noncitizens and naturalized citizens who had not yet become electors in the
appropriate region in Arizona. 26 The Court recognized the state's police
power to protect the well-being of its residents, but insisted that the state
may not
deny to lawful inhabitants, because of their race or national-
ity, the ordinary means of earning a livelihood .... [T]he
right to work for a living in the common occupations of the
community is of the very essence of the personal freedom
and opportunity that it was the purpose of the Amendment
to secure.2 7
Therefore, discrimination against aliens in order to preserve jobs for citi-
zens did not constitute a "special public interest" which would justify the
classification.28 The Court also folded a Supremacy Clause argument into
its equal protection analysis, finding that the statute's denial of the oppor-
tunity to work would effectively deny aliens the right to live in the state.29
This denial would conflict with the federal government's exclusive power to
control immigration and thus was not a legitimate state interest.30 The
Court held the statute to be void under the Equal Protection Clause.3
In Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, the Supreme Court ex-
amined a California statute that prohibited the issuance of commercial fish-
ing licenses "to person[s] ineligible to citizenship. 32  The State of
California, citing Truax, argued that the statute was necessary to protect a
"special public interest" of the state and its citizens.33 The Court rejected
23. Id. at 374.
24. Id. at 367-68.
25. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 35 (1915).
26. Id. at 41.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 41, 43.
29. See id. at 41-42.
30. Id. at 42.
31. Id. at 43.
32. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 413 (1948) (quoting 1945 Cal. Stat. 181)
(internal quotations omitted). The California legislature originally passed the statute in 1943, prohibit-
ing the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to "alien Japanese," but later changed the language for
fear of constitutional challenges. Id.
33. Id. at 417 (internal quotations omitted).
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this argument, finding California's collective ownership interest in the fish
within three miles of its coast to be an inadequate basis for denying aliens
lawfully residing in California the opportunity to earn a living from fishing
these waters.34 The Court found the statute unconstitutional, again folding
Supremacy Clause arguments into its equal protection analysis. It also
made a statement that would be heeded by the Court in future cases:
"[T]he power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants
as a class is confined within narrow limits."36
The Supreme Court first established aliens as a suspect class subject to
strict scrutiny in Graham v. Richardson.37 The plaintiffs in Graham were
lawfully admitted resident aliens who were denied state welfare benefits
due to their alienage.38 The Court noted that "[a]liens as a class are a
prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority."39 Therefore, the Court
would apply strict scrutiny regardless of whether a statute impaired a fun-
damental right.4" The statutes in Graham did not survive strict scrutiny.41
In so finding, the Court reasoned that aliens live, work, and pay taxes in the
state just as citizens do. Since aliens contributed to tax revenues in this
manner, the state did not have a "special public interest" in denying them
welfare benefits funded by those revenues.4"
In a case similar to the noted case, In re Griffiths, the Supreme Court
examined a Connecticut rule limiting eligibility for admission to its bar to
United States citizens.43 In its preliminary statements, the Court cited the
economic and social contributions of aliens, and in particular, the contribu-
tions of noncitizen lawyers." It also discussed the underlying precedents of
Yick Wo, Truax, Takahashi, and Graham.45 In this case, the Court reaf-
firmed the suspect status of classifications based on alienage: "Resident
aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed
Forces, and contribute in myriad other ways to our society. It is appropri-
ate that a State bear a heavy burden when it deprives them of employment
opportunities."46 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held that the rule un-
constitutionally discriminated against resident aliens, since disqualification
on the basis of alienage was unnecessary to achieve Connecticut's goal of
ensuring high professional standards for its bar members.47 It rejected the
state's argument that exclusion of aliens from the bar was justified because
34. Id. at 420-21.
35. See id. at 416-22.
36. Id. at 420.
37. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
38. Id. at 367, 369, 370.
39. Id. at 372 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
40. Id. at 376.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718 (1973).
44. Id. at 719.
45. Id. at 719-21.
46. Id. at 722.
47. Id. at 718, 722-23, 725.
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of the special role of the lawyer and possible divided allegiances.48 Finally,
citing Yick Wo, the Court warned against invidious discrimination, espe-
cially where suspect classifications are explicit.49
The Supreme Court again applied strict scrutiny to a classification
based on alienage in Examining Board of Engineers v. Flores de Otero.5"
In this case, the Court found unconstitutional a Puerto Rican statute limit-
ing the issuance of licenses for civil engineers to United States citizens.5
Puerto Rico failed to convince the Court that its justifications for the stat-
ute were "legitimate and substantial."52 One of these justifications was
that Puerto Rico wished to ensure that civil engineers would be financially
accountable to their clients.53 To this, the Court responded that the statute
swept too broadly; that there were other means to ensure financial respon-
sibility; and that citizenship does not guarantee that a civil engineer will be
financially responsible or remain in Puerto Rico or the United States.54
Plyler v. Doe is the only case in which the Court has applied height-
ened rational basis review to a class of aliens.5 In Plyler, the Court ad-
dressed the constitutionality of a Texas statute that excluded children who
were not U.S. citizens or "legally admitted" aliens from eligibility for state
educational funds; the statute also permitted Texas public schools to deny
admission to these children. 6 The Court began its analysis by observing
that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection to "any
person within its jurisdiction"5 " extends to aliens, whether lawfully or un-
lawfully present in the U.S. 8 The Court then specifically rejected the des-
ignation of undocumented aliens as a suspect class, noting that
undocumented aliens' entry into that class was both voluntary and a
crime.59 However, the Court distinguished the class targeted by the Texas
statute, since, as children, the plaintiffs did not have control over their par-
ents' decision to bring them into the country without documentation.6 °
Applying a heightened rational basis level of review, the Court held that
the Texas statute failed to further a substantial state interest, thereby vio-
lating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6'
48. Id. at 724 ("Certainly the Committee has failed to show the relevance of citizenship to any
likelihood that a lawyer will fail to protect faithfully the interest of his clients.").
49. Id. at 725.
50. Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602 (1976).
51. Id. at 575, 601.
52. Id. at 605.
53. ld. at 605-06.
54. Id. at 606.
55. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
56. Id. at 205.
57. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
58. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210-15.
59. Id. at 219 n.19.
60. See id. at 219-20.
61. See id. at 224, 230.
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Toll v. Moreno is the Supreme Court's only case that explicitly ad-
dresses a classification distinguishing between immigrant and nonimmi-
grant aliens.62 In Toll, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality
of a University of Maryland policy barring nonimmigrant aliens from quali-
fying for in-state tuition, regardless of domicile in the state.63 However, the
Toll Court resolved the case on Supremacy Clause grounds rather than on
equal protection grounds.6' First, the Court acknowledged that "state reg-
ulation not congressionally sanctioned that discriminates against aliens law-
fully admitted to the country is impermissible if it imposes additional
burdens not contemplated by Congress. '' 65 However, since Congress had
permitted G-4 aliens (unlike most nonimmigrant categories) to establish
domicile in the U.S., the Court determined that the university policy had
indeed imposed an additional burden on G-4 aliens.66 In so doing, its pro-
hibition of in-state status to G-4 aliens was in violation of the Supremacy
Clause. 67 However, the Court did not invalidate the policy as it applied to
other categories of nonimmigrants.
68
III. THE COURT'S DECISION
In the noted case, the court began by determining that the plaintiffs
had standing, that the case was ripe for adjudication, and that the defend-
ants were not immune from suit.69 It then proceeded to focus on the plain-
tiffs' equal protection claims.7" The court began its discussion of these
claims by holding that nonimmigrants do not constitute a suspect class and,
consequently, Section 3(B) is subject to only rational basis review.71 To
explain its rationale, the court drew a distinction between the law at issue
in Griffiths, which excluded all aliens from practicing law in Connecticut,
and Section 3(B), which excludes only "nonimmigrant aliens who are 'not
entitled to live and work in the United States permanently."' 72 The court
also asserted that nonimmigrants, unlike resident aliens, do not share the
same "benefits and burdens of citizenship" discussed by the Griffiths
Court.7 3
Moreover, the court asserted that Supreme Court precedent has not
applied a strict level of scrutiny to state laws affecting classes of aliens
62. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 3 (1982).
63. Id.
64. See id. at 10-17. See also DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-58 (1976) (finding that the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1952), did
not preclude a California statute prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens in certain circumstances).
65. Toll, 458 U.S. at 12-13 (quoting DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 358 n.6) (internal quotations omitted).
66. Id. at 14, 17.
67. Id. at 17.
68. See id.
69. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 414 (5th Cir. 2005).
70. Id. at 415-22.
71. Id. at 415.
72. Id. (quoting In re Bourke, 819 So. 2d 1020, 1022 (La. 2002)).
73. Id.
[VOL. 25:273
2006] EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS BY NONIMMIGRANT ALIENS 279
other than "permanent resident aliens."' 74 The court identified two factors
emphasized by the Supreme Court to justify strict scrutiny review of classi-
fications based on alienage.75 First, in tension with their "status as virtual
citizens," resident aliens are politically powerless.76 Second, resident aliens
share many traits in common with citizens.77 The court opined that treating
resident aliens as a suspect class resolves the tension between their inability
to vote and the benefits and responsibilities accompanying resident alien
status.78 In contrast, the court found that nonimmigrants' lack of political
power is a function of "their temporary connection to this country. ' 79 Fur-
thermore, the court found it inaccurate to describe nonimmigrants as an
insular class, given the many subcategories of nonimmigrants.8 °
The court emphasized Supreme Court precedent's focus on the simi-
larities between resident aliens and citizens.8' Specifically, both citizens
and resident aliens "pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the armed
forces, and contribute in a myriad of other ways to our society. '8 2 Nonim-
migrant aliens, on the other hand, are distinctly situated from permanent
residents and citizens, since they may remain in the United States for a
limited period, and "on the express condition they have 'no intention of
abandoning' their countries of origin and do not intend to seek permanent
residence in the United States. ' 83 In sum, the court did not interpret Su-
preme Court precedent as having extended suspect classification to aliens
other than resident aliens.84
The court then proceeded to reject plaintiffs' argument that nonimmi-
grant aliens make up a quasi-suspect class, warranting intermediate scru-
tiny.85 It also rejected the application of a heightened rational basis review
for nonimmigrant aliens.86 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs, unlike
the minor plaintiffs in Plyler, had voluntarily and knowingly chosen to
enter the United States under a temporary status.87 It also distinguished
the severity of being prohibited from engaging in a particular type of legal
work from the denial of a basic education in Plyler.88
The court then proceeded to apply rational basis review to Section
3(B). It observed that Section 3(B)'s exclusion of nonimmigrant aliens
74. Id. The court acknowledged that Plyler applied a heightened rational basis review where the
plaintiffs were children who did not hold legal status in the U.S. Id. at 416.






81. Id. at 418.
82. Id. (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973)).
83. Id. at 418-19 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F), (H), & (J)).
84. Id. at 419.
85. Id. at 419-20. The court cited lack of precedent, failing to find support in United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), which established gender classification as quasi-suspect. Id. at 420.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 421.
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from the state bar is intended to ensure "continuity and accountability in
legal representation."89 Moreover, the immigration status of nonimmi-
grants may easily end, and courts would have difficulty exercising jurisdic-
tion over nonimmigrant aliens once they depart the United States.9"
Consequently, the court held that Section 3(B) is rationally related to Loui-
siana's legitimate interest in "regulating the practice of those it admits to its
bar." 91
Finally, the court addressed the plaintiffs' due process and Supremacy
Clause arguments.92 The court found that the plaintiffs failed to state a
procedural due process claim, since they did not appeal the denial of their
equivalency applications. 93 The court rejected the Supremacy Clause argu-
ments, finding that "Section 3(B) is unquestionably a permissible exercise
of Louisiana's broad police powers to regulate employment within its juris-
diction for the protection of its residents."'94 Moreover, the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) does not preempt Section 3(B), even though
Section 3(B) concerns the employment of aliens, since unlike the statute in
Toll, Section 3(B) is not incongruous with the federal legislation.95
In his dissent, Judge Stewart disagreed with the majority on two key
points.96 First, he stated that the majority should have applied strict scru-
tiny review to Section 3(B). 97 Judge Stewart asserted that Supreme Court
precedent characterizing aliens as a suspect class encompasses nonimmi-
grant aliens by definition, finding it telling that the Court has declined to
distinguish between immigrants and nonimmigrants when speaking of law-
fully present aliens as a suspect class.98 Moreover, Judge Stewart viewed
Section 3(B) as discriminating against aliens as a class (rather than merely
nonimmigrant aliens as a class), since it affects only aliens.99 Judge Stewart
also pointed out that the INA does not use the term resident alien; he
viewed the Supreme Court's use of the term as referring to aliens who re-
side in the United States, without regard to their immigration status.1°°
Second, Judge Stewart argued that Section 3(B) fails to survive even
rational basis review.1 °1 He found unconvincing Louisiana's argument that
the admittance of nonimmigrant lawyers to the bar created a risk that law-
yers would abandon their clients mid-litigation, should they be deported or
choose to leave the country.10 2 He pointed out that citizens and immigrant
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 421-22.
92. Id. at 422-26.
93. Id. at 423.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 424.
96. See id. at 426-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 426 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 426-28 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 427 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
100. Id (Stewart, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 429-30 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 430 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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aliens are also free to travel or be domiciled outside of Louisiana, and both
immigrant and nonimmigrant aliens are subject to deportation. 10 3 In sum,
Judge Stewart believed that Rule 3(B) did not use the least restrictive




The key issue in LeClerc is how to define the insular class for purposes
of equal protection scrutiny. While the majority would limit the suspect
class to "resident aliens," the dissent would define it as encompassing all
legally admitted aliens, both immigrant and nonimmigrant. °5 The majority
correctly acknowledges that Supreme Court precedent contains some am-
biguity as to the level of review to which nonimmigrant aliens are sub-
ject.0 6 It is true that the plaintiffs in Supreme Court precedent applying
strict scrutiny were presumably "resident aliens."'0 7 Yet the Court's gen-
eral pronouncements in some of those cases tend to refer to aliens as a
class.10 8 Whether the Court purposely declined to extend the suspect class
to nonimmigrant aliens or implicitly included them in that class is unclear.
As the dissent points out, the term "resident alien" is not used in the
Immigration and Nationality Act, and thus is somewhat open to interpreta-
tion.10 9 The Supreme Court itself seems somewhat ambivalent about using
precise terminology as regards immigration status, perhaps implying that
the precise status is not its focus, as long as it is a legal status."0
The majority notes that the temporary nature of nonimmigrant alien
status puts nonimmigrants in a distinct position from "resident aliens.""'
Yet it fails to recognize the many characteristics that they share with resi-
dent aliens.'12 As the dissent points out, nonimmigrant aliens, like resident
aliens, pay taxes, are unable to vote, and have faced historical discrimina-
tion. 11 3 Given this middle-ground position, an intermediate scrutiny stan-
dard or a heightened rational review standard may be appropriate."
14
While somewhat distinct from resident aliens, nonimmigrant aliens have
103. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 431 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
105. See id. at 415, 426.
106. See id. at 415.
107. See Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 577 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717, 718 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 367, 369 (1971).
108. See LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 428 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Examining Bd., 426 U.S. at 601-06;
Graham, 403 U.S. at 371.
109. See LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 427 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
110. See, e.g., Examining Bd., 426 U.S. at 578 (describing plaintiff as a "legal resident of Puerto
Rico" without specifying her status or using the term "resident alien").
111. See LeClerc, 418 F.3d at 415-19.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 428-29 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
114. But see id. at 420-21 (distinguishing LeClerc from Plyler).
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legal status, and are thus also distinct from illegal immigrants whose "pres-
ence in this country in violation of federal law is not a 'constitutional
irrelevancy.' 1 15
In re Griffiths does not necessarily mandate a determination that Sec-
tion 3(B) violates the Fourteenth Amendment. In Griffiths, the Court
merely concluded that "[i]n sum, the Committee simply has not established
that it must exclude all aliens from the practice of law in order to vindicate
its undoubted interest in high professional standards."'1 6 Moreover, Loui-
siana's interest in LeClerc may be legitimate." 7 Yet, by excluding nonim-
migrant aliens from the suspect classification of aliens, the Fifth Circuit
may be setting a dangerous precedent that could serve to erode the rights
of nonimmigrants in other contexts.
115. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223; see LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 428 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
116. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 727 (1973) (emphasis added).
117. See LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 421-22.
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